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Introduction 
 
    Goods producers in Canada rely on transportation networks to 
move raw materials and intermediate goods among production sites 
and finished goods to domestic and international markets. Firms in 
the retail, tourism and other service sectors also depend on 
transportation networks to assemble supplies and goods for sale and 
to bring customers to their facilities. Events that disable parts of the 
transportation network –  ranging from weather emergencies to 
terrorist attacks – may affect freight transportation, degrade economic 
productivity and in extreme cases may trigger economic crises. The 
ability of public and private providers of transportation infrastructure 
and services to mitigate and recover from such events is therefore an 
important determinant of aggregate economic performance. Avoiding 
disruptions in freight movement between regions is vital for healthy 
trade and economic production.  
  
    The attacks of September 11, 2001 spurred development of 
assessment methodologies to help plan for emergency preparedness. 
However, basic risk assessment methodologies have been the subject 
of much criticism and major revisions over the past decade. Strategies 
for reducing consequences can be organized under three categories: 
hardening, response and resilience. Hardening involves making the 
physical assets (i.e. critical elements) of a system more damage 
resistant. Response, on the other hand, entails improving the ability of 
first responders to limit damage immediately following the event. As 
for resilience, the term can be used to describe how well a system can 
function in the aftermath of the event. It involves improving the 
ability of infrastructure to bounce back to its pre-event condition. 
While “response” pertains to mobilized action plans, “hardening” and 
“resilience” are more concerned with the critical elements comprising Maoh, Anderson & Burke  2 
the infrastructure. It can be argued that proper response plans can 
only take place if the critical elements of the infrastructure are 
identified.  
 
    In this paper, an intuitive yet appealing modeling approach is 
devised and applied to assess the resilience and critically of road 
transportation networks. More specifically, we examine the resiliency 
of the Ontario-Canada highway network for inter-city freight 
transportation, and examine the performance characteristics of the 
critical network elements with the help of Geographic Information 
Systems (GIS). Following Sheffi (2005), we contend that a resilient 
surface freight transportation system is one that is flexible or 
redundant (or a combination of the two). Flexibility refers to the 
ability to find alternatives to disrupted links by re-tasking existing 
links within the infrastructure to facilitate freight movement. This can 
be achieved through network redundancy. Intuitively, redundancy 
relates to the existence of alternative links that can be used to 
facilitate freight movement if the most critical links are disabled. To 
our knowledge, the approach proposed in this paper to handle 
highway network resilience is novel and has not been attempted in the 
past.  
 
    The remainder of our paper is organized into four sections. Section 
2 provides a literature review on critical infrastructure and network 
disruption analysis. Next, the third section provides an overview of 
the data used in the analysis as well as the devised methods used to 
assess redundancy and criticality of the Ontario road network. This is 
followed by a presentation and discussion of the results from the 
analysis in section 4. The last section provides a conclusion to our 
study and some directions for future research on the topic. 
 
Literature Review 
 
    In recent decades transportation network analysts have attempted 
to quantify certain indicators of network performance. More recently 
overlaps with the field of hazard risk assessment and emergency 
management have led to the study of network performance under 
disruption of certain parts of the transportation network due to Maoh, Anderson & Burke  3 
hazards.  Initial transportation network studies were concerned with 
the reliability of the network, often measured in travel time. Simply 
stated this was a measure of the ability to consistently get from Point 
A to Point B.  For example Asakura and Kashiwadani (1991) 
associated reliability of the network with the probability of reaching a 
destination from an origin within a specific time threshold.  This was 
a useful measure in calculating network performance under normal 
circumstances.  
 
    Following several major earthquakes that caused severe damage to 
transportation infrastructure in Loma Prieta, California in 1989; 
Northridge, California in 1994; and Kobe, Japan in 1995; researchers 
became interested in quantifying network performance  outside the 
norm, specifically in response to natural or manmade hazards 
(Guilano, 1998). In this case network reliability became a 
consequence of the disruption a network experienced during the 
hazard and recovery. Thus reliability was expanded to specifically 
examine different aspects of overall network performance in case 
such a disruption did occur. Some such indicators are: network 
vulnerability, criticality, robustness, and overall resilience.  
 
    Vulnerability is measured by the degree of accessibility loss in the 
presence of one or more linkage failures (D’Este and Taylor, 2003). 
Quantifying network vulnerability has emerged as a major paradigm, 
especially following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001; after 
which the vulnerability of all types of critical necessity networks 
came into question (Srinivasan, 2002). Since then a number of 
transportation network disruption studies have attempted to measure 
network vulnerability.  
 
    A common approach is to use trip movements through the 
transportation network to measure the vulnerability of the network in 
disruption. These flows can be used to measure connectivity loss 
between nodes as a means to measure vulnerability (Jenelius et al, 
2005), or to measure increases in travel time to assess the impact of 
lost linkages versus normal operating circumstances (Taylor and 
D’Este, 2007).  Utilizing thresholds are common to vulnerability 
studies as many have used travel time measurements in conjunction Maoh, Anderson & Burke  4 
with user defined thresholds to assess the performance of the network 
under disruption (Murray and Grubesic, 2007; Holmgren, 2007).  
 
    A related measure to vulnerability is criticality. This indicator is 
specific to linkages in the overall network. Criticality is measured by 
two factors, the probability of linkage failure and the consequence of 
linkage failure to the network as a whole (Jenelius, 2005). Generally 
transportation network degradation analysts are concerned with 
identifying the latter measure as quantifying event probability can be 
problematic due to lack of historical information and adaptive threats 
(Sheffi, 2005; Cox, Prager and Rose, 2011). 
 
    Critical linkages are identified through modeling trip flows 
throughout the network and are based on ranking links and nodes 
depending on their consequence to overall network accessibility 
(Jenelius 2005 & 2007; Scott et al, 2006, Chen et al, 2007). Once 
identified critical linkages can be degraded or removed from the 
model to assess the functionality of the network, mimicking a hazard 
scenario. Some studies sole purpose is to identify critical linkages on 
the network (Ham et al, 2005; Sohn, 2006). 
 
    Studies related to identifying vulnerability and criticality through 
factors of network capacity is known as robustness research. 
Robustness is a measure of the flexibility of the network to 
accommodate shifting capacity due to the degradation or loss of 
linkages (Scott el al, 2006). Network robustness is present when 
minimal increases origin-destination costs occur as capacity is shifted 
to alternative linkages in the presence of link degradation or loss and 
may be indicated by a robustness index (Ibid). Such costs can be 
quantified as increased travel time or associated monetary costs. 
Because of the focus on capacity and monetary cost, network 
robustness studies are often associated with the field of supply chain 
management (Dong, 2006; Wilson 2007). 
 
    One final term that has grown in common use is resilience. 
Resilience refers to the ability of the network to absorb or maintain 
function while shocked (McDaniels et al 2008; Rose, 2007) and 
bridges the terminology between persons in the field of risk Maoh, Anderson & Burke  5 
assessment and emergency preparedness with those in network 
analysis. To adequately measure the response of a network to hazard 
one must account for a multitude of network performance indicators 
(Schintler et al. 2007). Thus our work follows closely to the approach 
of Schintler (2007) by assessing the Ontario highway network. For a 
more comprehensive review of the study of transport networks under 
stress of hazard see:  Sullivan et al, 2009. 
 
 
 
 
Methods of Analysis 
 
Study Area and Data 
    The Province of Ontario in Canada, as shown in Figure 1, is the 
targeted study area. Ontario is the economic heartland of Canada and 
as such generates a lot of goods movement activities and trucking 
within and between its various local markets. Therefore, road network 
disruptions can have detrimental outcomes not only for the Province’s 
economy but also the economy of Canada as a whole. The province is 
house of 19 major Census Metropolitan Areas (CMAs) including the 
CMA of Toronto, which is the largest in Canada. Given the regional 
scope of our study, the analysis is concerned with the interregional 
economic flows among the 19 major CMAs of Ontario. Trucking 
flow data from Statistics Canada were employed in the analysis. 
Those data are extracted from the trucking commodity origin-
destination survey (TCODS) for the years 2007, 2008 and 2009. The 
data represents the total tonnes shipped by commodity type between 
the different CMAs within Ontario. A method is devised to translate 
tonnage flows into truck trips using data from the vehicle inventory 
and use survey (VIUS). The latter, which was retrieved from the US 
census bureau, contains information about the average empty and 
loaded trucking weights by commodity, distance traveled, and 
number of empty loads by commodity type. The average weight 
𝑤(𝑐,𝑑) of loads shipped by commodity type c and distance traveled d 
is used to convert tonnage shipped 𝑔(𝑐,𝑑/𝑖𝑗) into truck trips by 
commodity type c, that is: Maoh, Anderson & Burke  6 
𝑇𝑖𝑗
𝑐 =
𝑔(𝑐,𝑑/𝑖𝑗)
𝑤(𝑐,𝑑)
 
The total truck trips between origin i  and destination j  is then 
calculated by summing over all commodities  c.  The result of the 
above calculation is an origin-destination matrix  (342 × 342) of 
truck flows among the 18 major CMAs in Ontario. 
 
    The other dataset used in the analysis is the road network of 
Ontario. The latter is a Geographical Information System (GIS) 
shapefile that is extracted from the 2009 Desktop Mapping 
Technology Inc. (DMTI) route logistics GIS database. The extracted 
shapefile contained links representing major roads in the province 
including freeways, provincial highways and county/rural highways. 
The data also has the posted speed limit, length and free-flow travel 
time for each link in the network. The design capacity for each link is 
built into the DMTI shapefile using another road network shapefile 
that is acquired from the GeoBase database supported by the 
GeoConnections program  supported by Natural Resource Canada. 
The latter dataset includes information on the number of lanes that 
each road link has. Consequently, the number of lanes was transferred 
from the GeoBase shapefile to the DMTI shapefile using a spatial 
overlay and joint procedure in ArcGIS. Passenger car per hour per 
lane (pcphpl) factors from the highway capacity manual (HCM) are 
then employed to calculate the design capacity of each link based on 
the type and speed limit of the link. The result is a highway road 
network for the province of Ontario with approximately 30,000 links 
each having information on posted speed limit, free-flow travel time 
and design capacity. Maoh, Anderson & Burke  7 
 
Figure 1. Major Census Metropolitan Areas (CMAs) in the Province 
of Ontario, Canada    Maoh, Anderson & Burke  8 
Modeling Approach 
    To understand the concept of network redundancy, consider the 
following example of Just in Time (JIT) delivery, in which engines 
produced by an auto-engine plant at origin city i  has to be JIT 
delivered to an auto-assembly plant in city j. If we assume that Route 
1, as shown in Figure 2, guarantees a JIT delivery, then the network 
enjoys complete redundancy if and only if travel time 𝜏1 on Route 1 is 
equal to travel time 𝜏2 on Route 2. On the other hand, if Route 2 did 
not exist, then the network is said to have zero or no redundancy and 
consequently no resiliency. Typically, complete redundancy is hard to 
achieve in most regional networks since the designed capacity of 
roads is highest for the links comprising Route 1 or what can also be 
referred to as the primary route. The links comprising this route 
would be the ones with highest capacity and speed and as such 
guarantee the shortest path between origin i and destination j even in 
the presence of traffic.  
 
 
Figure 2. Example of two routes connecting an origin-destination pair 
 
    Although redundancy is a pre-condition for resiliency, it can be 
argued that complete redundancy is not necessarily the ultimate 
objective in order to have a resilient network. Recall that the main 
characteristic of a resilient system is flexibility which is guaranteed 
through redundancy. In the above example, the network can be 
considered redundant if Route 2 can be used as a feasible alternative 
in the absence of Route 1. This does not mean that the travel time 
𝜏2 on Route 2 should be equal to the travel time 𝜏1 on Route 1. Maoh, Anderson & Burke  9 
Instead, redundancy could exist if |𝜏2 − 𝜏1| ≤  𝜀, where 𝜀 here is an 
acceptable difference in time that still guarantees a JIT delivery for 
the above example. Following the above notion, a way to determine 
the existence of network redundancy in a real interregional network, 
like the Ontario network, is to identify the most critical links other 
than primary links. Subsequently 𝜀  can be calculated for each 
connected origin-destination pair i,  j. To achieve this goal, a 
hierarchical approach is devised to explore the redundancy of the 
Ontario road network and to calculate 𝜀 at various levels of hierarchy.  
 
    First, the hierarchy level 1 network, which represents the primary 
network connecting all major origin-destination markets, is identified 
using the existing Ontario highway network. The hierarchy level 1 
network is based on calculating the shortest paths connecting all 
origin-destination pairs i  and  j  on the network. The shortest path 
(SNP1) will return 𝜏𝑖𝑗,1 for each origin-destination pair i and j. Next, 
road links pertaining to the hierarchy level 1 network SNP1 are 
omitted and the shortest path (SNP2) representing the hierarchy level 
2 network (i.e. secondary network) connecting the various origin-
destination markets is re-calculated. The shortest path SNP2 for the 
secondary network will return 𝜏𝑖𝑗,2 for all the origin-destination pairs 
i  and  j  that have connectivity under this secondary network. It is 
worth noting that in the absence of the primary network links certain 
origin-destination pairs i, j might lose connectivity. That is, for some 
origin-destination pairs (i, j), only the primary shortest path route is 
the available route to allow flows between those i and j pairs. Lastly, 
the road links corresponding to the first and second hierarchal level 
networks are dropped from the Ontario highway network to calculate 
and explore the existence of a third hierarchal level network which 
could provide redundancy. The resulting shortest path links SNP3 
will return 𝜏𝑖𝑗,3  for the connected origin-destination pairs i  and  j. 
Again, certain origin-destination pairs will lose their connectivity in 
the absence of those links representing the primary and secondary 
networks. 
 
    The shortest path routes for each hierarchal level are calculated via 
the Network Analyst Extension of ArcGIS 10.0. At first the 
calculated shortest path under each hierarchal network was calculated Maoh, Anderson & Burke  10 
using the free-flow travel time associated with each link. However, 
the effect of traffic on the networks had to be accounted for in order 
to obtain a more realistic measure of the estimated travel time 𝜏𝑖𝑗,ℎ for 
each hierarchal level h. This is important since the interaction 
between traffic flow and road capacity determines travel time in 
practice. For this, the estimated truck trips 𝑇𝑖𝑗 were assigned to the 
shortest path networks to determine the flows on each road link. 
Passenger Car Equivalency (PCE) rate of 2.5 was used to convert 
trucks into passenger cars before a traffic assignment can be 
performed. Also, we assumed that 8 percent of the total truck trips 
occur within a typical peak hour of the day. Upon these adjustments, 
the truck trips were assigned to the network. Furthermore, to capture 
the effect of passenger vehicles, we followed the literature by 
assuming that each truck on the network will be faced with 27 
passenger vehicles. The estimated overall traffic flow 𝑓 𝑙 on each link l 
in a typical peak hour of the day is then used to calculate the 
congested travel time 𝑡𝑡𝑙
′ on each link l of the hierarchal networks 
using the following conventional link performance function: 
 
𝑡𝑡𝑙
′ = 𝑡𝑡𝑙
0 �1 + 0.15�
𝑓 𝑙
𝐷𝑙
�
4
� 
 
where 𝑡𝑡𝑙
0 and 𝐷𝑙 are the free flow travel time and design capacity of 
link l, respectively.   
 
Results and Discussion 
 
    The hierarchy level 1 network connecting the major 19 CMAs in 
Ontario is shown in Figure 3. The map indicates that most CMAs are 
connected via the major 400 series highways as expected. All 19 
CMAs are connected via 342 shortest paths which share common 
links from the Ontario road network. We contend that the number of 
times a road link is used by the different shortest paths provide a 
meaningful measure of criticality. Figure 4,  on the other hand, 
presents a map which highlights the most critical road links of the 
Ontario network. After exploring the generated data, we are able to 
identify the critical links as those that are used by at least at least 80 
shortest paths. On the other hand, we are also able to define the most Maoh, Anderson & Burke  11 
critical links as those that gets used by at least 120 shortest paths. 
Following this classification, the most critical links in Ontario are 
highway 401 southwest of Ontario through Toronto, highway 400 
from Toronto through Barrie and highway 69 which stretches to 
northern Ontario. 
Figure 3. Hierarchy level 1 and 2 road networks 
 
    Figure 3 also represents the hierarchy level 2 network of Ontario. It 
is found that when moving from hierarchy level 1 to hierarchy level 
2, the number of possible paths reduces from 342 to 210. This is 
reflected in Figure 3 as northwestern Ontario becomes unreachable 
via the hierarchy level 2 network. Obviously, this situation is a clear 
illustration of the vulnerability of remote CMAs in the province. In 
terms of travel time, the average uncongested travel time between 
origin-destination pairs from level 1 and level 2 only increases by 46 
minutes (i.e. 29%). The observed increase represents a reasonable 
high level of network redundancy for southern Ontario, as can be also 
discerned from Figure 3. It should be noted that the increase in 
uncongested travel time is due to both network circuity and lower Maoh, Anderson & Burke  12 
maximum speed on secondary (rural) highways used by the level 2 
type network. Table 1 provides a summary statistics for the calculated 
average uncongested travel times from SNP1 and SNP2. The 
generated statistics indicate that  𝜀  can range from 8.6 minutes to 
132.1 minutes. This suggests that certain origin-destination pairs are 
more resilient with a relatively small 𝜀 while others have very low 
resiliency.  
 
Figure 4: Critical links on the Ontario road network 
 
Table 1. Summary Statistics of uncongested average travel time of 
SNP1 and SNP2 
 
SNP1 
 
SNP2  |𝜏2 − 𝜏1| 
Count  210 
 
210   
Mean  159.8 
 
205.9  46.1 
Maximum  487.8 
 
619.9  132.1 
Minimum  19.2 
 
27.8  8.6 
Range  468.6 
 
592.1   Maoh, Anderson & Burke  13 
Variance  9466 
 
15532   
Standard Deviation  97.3 
 
124.7   
    When considering hierarchy level 3 network, the possible paths 
connecting markets reduce down to 62 shortest paths. Under level 3, 
critical origin-destination pairs such as Toronto and Windsor become 
unreachable. Given that |𝜏2 − 𝜏1| for this pair is 74 minutes (33%) 
and   |𝜏3 − 𝜏2|  approaches  ∞  one  can  deduce  that  the  network 
supporting this pair is not highly resilient. Moving from level 1 and 
level to level 3 hierarchy, the average uncongested travel time 
increases in excess of 1 hour  (i.e. 53%) and many of the origin-
destination locations lose connectivity, as shown in Figure 5. The loss 
of connectivity among the majority of markets suggests a weak level 
of overall redundancy. However, certain market pairs are more 
resilient as suggested by the figures shown in Table 2.  
 
Figure 5. Hierarchy level 3 road network 
 
    Congestion will have a significant impact on the redundancy and 
resiliency of the network. Table 3 presents the results for the Maoh, Anderson & Burke  14 
Windsor-Toronto corridor. It is clear that under congestion the level 
of resiliency will deteriorate when moving from level 1 to level 2. 
|𝜏2 − 𝜏1| is equal to 145 minutes which is almost a 60% increase. 
Overall, the maximum congestion index for the level 1 is estimated to 
be 7.02. The index increases to 8.67 when moving to the level 2 
hierarchy and to 9.10 under the level 3 hierarchy.  
 
  Table 2: Summary Statistics of uncongested average travel 
time of SNP1, SNP2 and SNP3 
 
SNP1  SNP2  |𝜏2 − 𝜏1|  SNP3  |𝜏3 − 𝜏2| 
Count  62  62 
 
62 
  Mean  97.4  124.8  27.4  190.7  65.9 
Maximum  215.2  268.8  53.6  329  60.2 
Minimum  19.2  27.7  8.5  34  6.3 
Range  196  241.1 
 
295 
  Variance  2462  3669 
 
6817 
  Standard Deviation  49.6  60.6 
 
82.6 
   
Table 3: Congested travel time under hierarchal levels 1, 2, and 3 for 
the Windsor-Toronto case 
Windsor - Toronto  SNP1  SNP2  SNP3  |𝜏2 − 𝜏1| 
Average Congestion  1.27  1.53  Not possible 
  Congested Travel 
Times (min)  245  390  Not possible  145 
 
Conclusion 
 
    This paper presented a simple and intuitive approach for assessing 
the resilience of road surface transportation networks. A hierarchal 
network approach is devised and used to identify critical links and 
also assess the level of redundancy on the network using the 
interregional highway network of the province of Ontario in Canada 
as a case study. While the devised approach can be applied to 
individual link disruptions, several observations emerged from the Maoh, Anderson & Burke  15 
large scale application. We found that the southern  Ontario road 
network has at leave 1 level of built in redundancy. However, certain 
corridors connecting certain markets are more resilient than others. 
On the other hand, northern regions are especially vulnerable to 
network disruptions due to lack of redundancy.  
 
    Furthermore, the Toronto CMA, which is the largest in Ontario and 
Canada, has only one level of redundancy. The devised approach 
enabled us to identify the most critical links on the network. Critical 
links are those that are heavily utilized by the various shortest paths 
connecting the different origin-destination markets. Therefore, 
enumerating the number of times a road link is used provides a 
simple index of criticality of the network. In this regard, highly 
critical links are found in both the south and north parts of the 
province. Finally, congestion and network road capacity has a major 
impact on travel time and consequently the resiliency of the road 
network. 
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